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MANDATORY ARREST: THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA'S PREVENTION OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AMENDMENT ACT OF 1990
Last night I heard the screaming, loud voices behind the wall ....
It won't do no good to call the police always come late, if they
come at all ....
Tracy Chapman, "Behind The Wall"'
Only in recent years has society begun to view violent relationships be-
tween men and women with a critical eye.2 This heightened awareness is
primarily due to the women's movement of the past two decades.3 Conclu-
sive data on the incidence of domestic violence does not exist, but estimates
suggest that between 1.8 and 6 million women are physically abused each
year by the men with whom they have been intimately involved.4
Experts have shown that violence is learned behavior, therefore domestic
violence has a great impact on family members.' One study found that sub-
jects who acted violently towards their spouses witnessed violent behavior
between their parents while growing up.6 Another study also emphasized
the effect domestic violence has on children who witness it:
When a child grows up in a home where parents use lots of physi-
cal punishment and also hit each other, the chances of becoming a
1. TRACY CHAPMAN, BEHIND THE WALL, TRACY CHAPMAN (Elektra/Asylum 1988).
2. Cf Howard Schneider, Battered Women Defense Bill Nears Passage in Maryland,
WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1991, at C3 (discussing legislation introduced in the Maryland General
Assembly that would allow battered women being tried for retaliatory violence against their
mates to introduce evidence that they suffer from "battered woman syndrome").
3. KAREN BAKER ET AL., D.C. COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & WO-
MEN'S LAW & PUB. POL'Y FELLOWSHIP PROGRAM AT GEO. UNIV. L. CENTER, REPORT ON
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA POLICE RESPONSE To DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 4 (1989) (available
from the Georgetown Sex Discrimination Clinic, Washington, D.C.).
4. Jeffrey A. Shapiro, Note, The Inadequate Police Protection of Battered Wives: Can a
City and Its Police Be Held Liable Under The Equal Protection Clause?, 14 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 417, 417-8 (1986). See also Barbara K. Finesmith, Police Response to Battered Women: A
Critique and Proposals for Reform, 14 SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 77 (1983) (discussing the
varying conclusions reached by studies attempting to ascertain definitive statistical data on the
frequency with which violence between adult partners occurs).
5. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, UNDER THE RULE OF THUMB: BATIrERED WO-
MEN AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 3 (1982) [hereinafter U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS].
6. RICHARD J. GELLES, THE VIOLENT HOME 169-70 (1972).
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violent husband, wife, or parent are greatest of all: About one of
every four people who grew up in these most violent households
use at least some physical force on their spouses in any one year
.... [O]ne out of ten of the husbands who grew up in violent
families are wife-beaters in the sense of serious assault. This is over
three times the rate for husbands who did not grow up in such
violent homes.'
Domestic violence also affects the area of health care. Injuries resulting
from domestic violence require health care providers-particularly those in
the area of emergency services-to expend significant time and resources for
treatment. In studying ways to combat this wave of violence, researchers
conclude that improving the police response to incidents of domestic vio-
lence will result in fewer incidents and decreased recidivism rates, thereby
reducing the injuries requiring medical attention.9
For the greater part of the twentieth century, the only relief available to
victims of domestic violence was to press charges for criminal assault and
battery.1° However, due to police reluctance to arrest perpetrators, these
charges were rarely filed." In the 1970s, states began to make civil protec-
tion orders available to victims,' 2 but the limited enforcement of these orders
by the police resulted in the de facto decriminalization of violence within the
confines of a familial or sexual relationship.13
Proponents of mandatory arrest of perpetrators have criticized the man-
ner in which police handle situations of family violence.' 4 Since the 1960s,
7. MURRAY A. STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY 122 (1980).
8. According to one study, battering injuries accounted for one out of every four emer-
gency room visits made by women. See E. Van Stark et al., Wife Abuse In The Medical
Setting: An Introduction For Health Personnel, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, Apr. 1981, at vii. The
paper also pointed out that a Harris poll of Kentucky housewives revealed that 17% of women
abused by their spouses seek emergency medical services. Id.
9. See Finesmith, supra note 4, at 108; U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note
5, at 91.
10. David L. Gottlieb & L. Eric Johnson, Reform In Kansas Domestic Violence Legisla-
tion, 31 KAN. L. REV. 527, 531 (1983).
11. Id. The authors state that the primary reason for the failure of law enforcement per-
sonnel to arrest was their perception that victims were reluctant to bring criminal charges
against their assaulter and to cooperate if and when such charges were brought. Id.
12. Elizabeth Truninger, Marital Violence: The Legal Solutions, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 259,
267 (1971).
13. Gottlieb & Johnson, supra note 10, at 531. Gottlieb and Johnson charge that due to
the refusal of police to arrest perpetrators, criminal acts of domestic abuse have been underre-
ported, underprosecuted, and undeterred. Id. Researchers have found that domestic abuse is
one of this country's most underreported crimes. Id.
14. Memorandum from Denise Duval to the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence
1-2 (Aug. 2, 1988) (on file with the JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW AND POL-
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police department policies have stressed avoiding arrest thereby encouraging
officers to employ conflict resolution techniques that focus on the use of of-
ficers' mediation skills.15 However, battered women and their advocates
criticized the use of mediation techniques. They charged that non-enforce-
ment of criminal assault laws conveyed a message to both victims and perpe-
trators that society condoned violent behavior within the confines of
intimate, adult relationships. 16
In response to these criticisms and increased public pressure for solutions
to the problem of domestic violence, twelve states enacted legislation man-
dating that police enforce criminal assault laws when confronted with cases
of domestic abuse. 7 In the District of Columbia, a 1989 study of the re-
sponse of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) to incidents of do-
mestic violence was a primary factor that influenced the D.C. City Council
to enact legislation to alter police behavior. 8
The District of Columbia's Prevention of Domestic Violence Amendment
Act of 1990 (PDVAA) is an example of a mandatory arrest law.' 9 The
PDVAA requires "a law enforcement officer [to] arrest a person [without a
warrant] if the law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the
person committed an intrafamily offense."20 The Act requires police officers
to file written reports for all domestic incidents to which they respond and to
maintain a computerized record of all civil protection orders and bench war-
icy). This memo also states that the police must begin to treat domestic violence as a serious
crime and develop a consistent response when confronting these situations. Id.
15. Finesmith, supra note 4, at 85. Officers generally walked the batterer around the
block to cool him off or suggested that one of the parties spend the night at a friend or rela-
tive's home. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 19.
16. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 19. Not only was the use of
mediation as a substitute for arrest criticized, but commentators have viewed the neutral ter-
minology and nonauthoritarian approach as evidence that police believed domestic violence
was a trivial matter. This trivialization resulted in victims experiencing feelings of both hope-
lessness and resignation. Id.
17. By 1988, 12 states had enacted mandatory arrest laws: Connecticut, Iowa, Louisiana,
Maine, Massachussets, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, Washing-
ton, and Wisconsin. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38b (West Supp. 1991); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 236.2 (West 1985); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2140(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1991); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 770(5) (West Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 209A, § 6(7)
(West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518B.01 (14) (West Supp. 1991); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 171.137(1) (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-5(a) (West Supp. 1991); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1989); OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2) (West Supp. 1991).
18. COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT TO THE COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA 3 (1990) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE COUNCIL].
19. Id. PDVAA is this author's acronym for the statute.
20. D.C. Prevention of Domestic Violence Amendment Act (PDVAA) of 1990, §§ 16-
1031 to -1034, 37 D.C. REG. 5001 (1990).
19921
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rants issued for intrafamily offenses. 2
The PDVAA makes four specific changes in the manner in which the D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department handles incidents of domestic violence. It
amends Chapter 10 of the D.C. Code by requiring (1) a law enforcement
officer to arrest a person without a warrant if there is probable cause to
believe that the person committed an intrafamily offense,22 (2) a law en-
forcement officer to file written reports of incidents of domestic violence,23
(3) the Metropolitan Police Department to incorporate into its educational
program a training program for new and currently employed officers,24 and
(4) the District police to maintain a computerized record of all civil protec-
tion orders and bench warrants issued by the Family Division of the D.C.
Superior Court." Supporters of the PDVAA predict that its implementation
will result in a significant decline in the number of domestic violence cases in
the District of Columbia.26 They base their prediction on several studies
that conclude that arrest produces dramatic reductions in the number of
repeat incidents of domestic violence because perpetrators are forced to con-
front the fact that neither the police, nor society as a whole, condone or
ignore domestic violence.27
This Comment examines previous methods of police response to domestic
violence and the criticisms directed at this response that resulted in enact-
ment of mandatory arrest laws. The focus will be exclusively on violence
arising between adult men and women who are, or have been, involved in a
marriage or intimate relationship. This Comment will also examine the con-
tent of the PDVAA, the rationale behind it, and the events leading to its
21. Id. § 16-1032, 37 D.C. REG. 5001. The Intra-Family Act, D.C. CODE § 16-1001 con-
verts a criminal assault committed within an intimate relationship into an "intrafamily of-
fense." This permits victims to petition the Intrafamily Branch, Family Division of D.C.
Superior Court for the injunctive remedy of a civil protection order. BAKER ET AL., supra note
3, at 9 n.4, 13.
22. § 16-1031, 37 D.C. REG. at 5001.
23. Id. § 16-1032, 37 D.C. REG. at 5001.
24. Id. § 16-1034, 37 D.C. REG. at 5001.
25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-131 (1991).
26. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 2.
27. See BAKER ET AL., supra note 3, at I n.2 (discussing the results of a study conducted
by the Minneapolis Police Department and the National Police Foundation). While commen-
tators have widely cited this study, at least one article criticizes it. According to this critique,
the weaknesses of the study include: the size of the sample (314 people), the fact that Minneap-
olis is an atypical city (i.e. little violence, long winters, low unemployment, large Native Amer-
ican population), and the city's practice of keeping arrested batterers overnight (most
jurisdictions release an offender on his own recognizance once the arrest paperwork is com-
plete). All of these factors lessen the dramatic impact of the study's results because they are
unlikely to exist in other metropolitan areas. The article also points out that the ongoing
interviewing of victims may have deterred batterers. Jon Cohen, And The Beats Go On, WASH.
CITY PAPER, Feb. 3-9, 1989, at 18.
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enactment. The PDVAA's strengths and weaknesses will then be compared
to the twelve mandatory arrest laws enacted in other jurisdictions prior to
1988. Finally, this Comment proposes amendments which would increase
the PDVAA's effectiveness in reducing domestic violence in the District of
Columbia.
I. PREVIOUS METHODS OF POLICE RESPONSE
And when they arrive, they say they can't interfere with domestic
affairs, between a man and his wife ....
Tracy Chapman, "Behind The Wall"2
A. Early American Law
American law developed out of the traditions and rules of British common
law.29 British law, and Western civilization as a whole, had long condoned
the physical punishment of wives by their husbands.3° In the eyes of the
law, upon marriage, a man and a woman became one person, embodied in
the man. a" From that moment on, the husband was responsible for his
wife's behavior.32 The law allowed him to monitor his wife's conduct and to
punish her for behaving inappropriately.33 The "rule of thumb" instructed a
husband that he could use a "rod not thicker than his thumb" to chastise his
wife.34 In America, both common and statutory law subscribed to the Brit-
ish view of violence within marriage. 35
In the 1870s, with the impetus of ideas of the Enlightenment and the be-
ginning of the American suffrage movement, the American judiciary began
28. CHAPMAN, supra note 1.
29. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 2.
30. Id..
31. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J. dissenting).
32. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 2.
33. Id. The Commission's report provides an illustrative quote drawn from Blackstone's
1765 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND as cited in Terry Davidson, Wife Beating:
A Recurring Phenomenon Throughout History, in BATTERED WOMEN: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
STUDY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 19 (Maria Roy ed., 1977). "For as [the husband] is to answer
for [the wife's] misbehavior, the law thought it reasonable to intrust [sic] him with this power
of chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his apprentices or
children ...." Id.
34. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 2 (citations omitted).
35. Finesmith, supra note 4, at 80. The author discusses the doctrine of coverture,
adopted by the American judiciary, which dictated that marriage caused the husband and wife
to become one person. See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J.
dissenting) (referring to the doctrine of coverture, noting that "[tihis rule has worked out in
reality to mean that though the husband and wife are one, the one [person] is the husband.").
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to reverse its position with regard to physical violence within marriage.36
The following decade saw states begin to enact statutes criminalizing wife-
beating.37 As public opinion increasingly condemned the physical abuse of
women by men, all American jurisdictions began to implement both crimi-
nal and civil remedies for victims.3 8
Presently, victims of domestic abuse may pursue criminal relief by press-
ing assault or battery charges or both against their assailants.3 9 However,
this remains difficult because of the traditional (and still prevalent) attitude
among police, prosecutors, and judges that non-stranger assaults are not as
serious as assaults by strangers.4° Police attitudes, in particular, consistently
reflect this view in regard to family violence between adult partners.41
Civil relief is currently available to victims of domestic violence in the
form of an injunction known as a civil protection order (CPO).42 These
injunctions require the assailant to refrain from further abuse of or contact
with the victim. 43 Judges can tailor these CPOs to provide for the individual
victim's particular needs by excluding the defendant from the home, if it is
shared by the parties, and requiring the payment of both child support and
36. This change is demonstrated by comparing State v. Black, 60 N.C. 274, 275 (Win)
(1864), which stated that the law would not interfere with a husband's right to physically
control his wife, with State v. Oliver, 70 N.C. 60, 61-62 (1874), which was decided only 10
years subsequent to Black and condemned husbands who physically abuse their wives.
37. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 2 (discussing an 1882 Maryland
enactment making wife-beating a criminal offense punishable by either 40 lashes or a year in
jail).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 8.
40. Id. See generally UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK
FORCE ON FAMILY VIOLENCE, FINAL REPORT (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter AT-rORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S TASK FORCE] (providing extensive examples of the traditional attitude toward domes-
tic violence). Comments such as the following from victims and their siblings are illustrative:
"A domestic situation... is looked at in an entirely different light. As soon as you explain to
the police ... she is married to him ... no one takes the situation seriously." Id. at 19.
My sister asked (the clerk of the court] what the record number of postponements on
a case such as this was. The clerk said that he remembered one case was delayed
twelve times .... She then said "Well, I guess he will have to kill me before this
comes to trial." We were postponed again that day to July 14, 1983-on that day we
buried my sister.
Id. at 41. "When he was picked up two weeks after the [bench] warrant was issued (for viola-
tion of a civil protection order], the police told me that Family Court warrants are low priori-
ties." Id. at 26.
41. ATrORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE, supra note 40, at 19.
42. PETER FINN & SARAH COLSON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL PROTECTION OR-
DERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (Mar. 1990) (dis-
cussing and responding to critics who charge that CPOs are difficult to draft and enforce and
that they are susceptible to fraud, due process, or equal protection violations because notice
and an opportunity to be heard are usually not provided to the defendant).
43. Id. at 2.
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spousal maintenance."
R Mediation: The Marriage of Police and Social Science
While the women's movement worked to increase public awareness of do-
mestic violence and states devised civil relief for victims, police departments
across the country began developing new methods of handling domestic dis-
turbances. Beginning in the late 1960s, police departments started to focus
training programs on the development of officers' mediation and conflict res-
olution skills.45 However, police misused these techniques. The designers of
the original program intended for police to apply the techniques only in ver-
bal disputes, not physically violent ones:
The psychologists assumed that situations involving violence and
assault exceeded the limits of "crisis intervention" and that police
powers of force and arrest would be invoked. Unfortunately, this
was not to happen. Because there was no further analysis of the
problem, training, and direction, police officers have been taught to
handle all family conflict calls with these reconciliation techniques.
If more precise guidelines had been developed as to when and in
what circumstances to use these techniques, police handling of
spousal violence calls might well have been more effective.4 6
Police responded to their critics by offering various rationales for their use of
mediation techniques rather than arrest in situations of domestic violence.
These rationales include: 1) arrest violates marital privacy, 2) economic det-
riment would result from the male "breadwinner's" incarceration, 3) accept-
ance of marital violence within the parties' culture, 4) possibilities of severe
retaliation after the defendant's release, 5) preservation of the familial struc-
ture, 6) futility of arrest due to complainant attrition, 7) inadequate police
resources, and 8) high incidence of police injury during domestic disturbance
calls.47
44. Id.
45. Finesmith, supra note 4, at 85; see also U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra
note 5, at 18. Finesmith suggests that this development evolved out of an experimental pro-
gram conducted in New York City in 1967. The program involved the formation of a family
crisis unit within the New York City Police Department. Officers assigned to the unit under-
went intensive training in crisis intervention, interpersonal conflict management techniques,
and the use of referrals to social service agencies. The experiment was conducted for a two
year period and at its conclusion, it was found to have reduced the number of both domestic
disturbance calls and officer injuries. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at
18.
46. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 18-19 (quoting NANCY LOV-
ING, RESPONDING To SPOUSE ABUSE AND WIFE BEATING 36 (1980)).
47. Lisa R. Beck, Note, Protecting Battered Women: A Proposal For Comprehensive Do-
mestic Violence Legislation In New York, 15 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 999, 1021-22 (1987). See
also Shapiro, supra note 4, at 435 (listing and discussing these same rationales).
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Nevertheless, critics have offered counter arguments to several of these
justifications. First, the marital privacy argument is indefensible because
courts have held that the right to privacy shields acts from government in-
trusion only when both parties consent and the act does not impair their
health and safety.48 Second, the economic detriment argument is illogical
because police fail to express similar concern about the economic detriment
experienced by the families of other incarcerated criminals.4 9 Furthermore,
empirical evidence does not support police complaints that women battered
by their spouses generally fail to follow through with prosecuting their as-
sailants. No objective data exists that shows an increase in complainant at-
trition rates when a victim and her assailant are either married or
cohabitating.5 ° Lastly, police concerns about the supposed threat to their
safety presented by a domestic violence call are unfounded. A study con-
ducted in New York City concluded that domestic disturbance calls ac-
counted for only two percent of the total number of assaults committed
against police officers.5" In rejecting these rationalizations, advocates for
battered women consistently assert that only by arresting an abuser will he
be forced to realize that society views his behavior and attitude as
unacceptable. 52
One factor that universally impeded arrest in situations of domestic vio-
lence was the requirement in all fifty states and the District of Columbia that
police obtain a warrant before they arrest an individual for a misdemeanor
offense unless the crime was committed in their presence.53 Generally, war-
rantless arrests are permitted only when an officer possesses probable cause
to believe that a felony has occurred.54 However, domestic violence often
involves misdemeanor assaults and batteries, rather than felonious ones.55
This caused legislatures to structure mandatory arrest statutes so that they
48. See People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (N.Y. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020 (1985).
In Liberta, the New York Court of Appeals held the marital rape exemption of New York
Penal Law § 130 unconstitutional because the right to privacy protects from state interference
only consensual acts, not violent assaults. Id. at 574.
49. Beck, supra note 47, at 1023.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1024.
52. Gottlieb & Johnson, supra note 10, at 535. See also Lisa G. Lerman, Expansion Of
Arrest Power: A Key To Effective Intervention, 7 VT. L. REV. 59, 60 (1982) (discussing the
agreement among researchers that one of the primary causes of spousal violence is the com-
monly held belief among batterers that physical abuse of women is normal, acceptable
behavior).
53. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 (1976) (discussing whether police
officers had probable cause to arrest defendant).
54. Id.
55. Gottlieb & Johnson, supra note 10, at 534.
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require warrantless arrests for misdemeanor acts of domestic abuse.5 6 The
PDVAA conforms to this model.
C. Developments Within The District Of Columbia
Until 1987, no explicit policy regarding domestic violence guided the Met-
ropolitan Police Department." The Department's training program empha-
sized the use of mediation techniques, resulting in a general practice of
officers not arresting assailants.5" In 1987, the MPD responded to pressure
from local advocates for battered women, primarily the D.C. Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (DCCADV), and issued a General Order outlin-
ing procedures for officers to follow when responding to domestic violence
calls.59 General Order 701.5 stated:
- criminal offenses occurring in domestic situations shall be treated
like any other criminal offense;
- where probable cause exists to believe a criminal offense has oc-
curred, there is a presumption in favor of arrest;
- factors such as the existence of a Civil Protection Order, visible
injury, etc., should be taken into account in determining probable
cause to arrest;
- factors such as the relationship of the parties should not unduly
influence the decision to arrest; and
- arrest for unlawful entry should be made when a respondent vio-
lates a stay-away provision in a Civil Protection Order in the face
of a police warning to leave.'
After the order took effect, the DCCADV conducted a study of police
response to domestic violence under the new department policy.61 While the
MPD receives approximately 19,000 calls concerning domestic violence each
year," the study revealed that police made arrests in only 5% of the inci-
dents surveyed.6 a The study concluded that the MPD's adoption of General
56. For an example of this type of mandatory arrest statute, see MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch.
209A, § 6(7)(b) (Law.-Coop. 1991).
57. BAKER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 3.
60. Id. The MPD drafted this General Order in consultation with the Legal Committee
of the D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1. The study was based on interviews with 300 victims of domestic violence. Id.
at 3. The subjects were drawn from two survey populations: (1) victims who sought assistance
from the D.C. Citizens' Complaint Center, and (2) victims who sought relief directly from the
D.C. Superior Court. Id. at 12.
63. Id. at 46. The DCCADV found that police made notes regarding incidents in 30.7%
of the 300 cases surveyed. However, officers took notes in 64.3% of the cases when an arrest
was made. The authors of the study suggested that the note taking represented active, con-
1992]
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Order 701.5 had no significant effect on the manner in which police handled
incidents of nonstranger assault. 64
The results of the study caused local advocates to increase their legislative
lobbying.65 However, these efforts alone did not convince the D.C. City
Council to act. It was not until several federal courts held that the failure of
police to enforce criminal assault laws in a consistent manner-treating
stranger and non-stranger assaults differently-constituted a violation of 42
U.S.C. § 1983 that the possibility of courts imposing liability on cities or
states and their police departments for failure to arrest arose.66 This threat
of potential liability spurred the Council to act.67
Il. ARREST Now OR PAY LATER
In 1984, the United States District Court for Connecticut allowed a victim
of domestic violence to bring a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
against the city of Torrington, Connecticut and its police department.
68
Tracey Thurman, a resident of Torrington, made repeated complaints to the
city's police force concerning threats made against her and her child by her
estranged husband Charles.69 Between October 1982 and June 10, 1983,
Charles Thurman attacked and threatened Tracey and her son on at least
five separate occasions.7" Throughout this period Tracey and various wit-
nesses to these attacks attempted to'press criminal charges against Charles,
but the police never responded to their efforts.7 ' On May 6, 1983, Tracey
obtained an ex parte restraining order that forbade Charles from assaulting,
threatening, and harassing her.7 2 On May 27 and May 31, Tracey attempted
to swear out a warrant for her husband's arrest. She finally secured it on
cerned listening by police, which made them more likely to view and treat the incident like any
other call involving criminal activity. Id.
64. Id. at 3-4.
65. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 1.
66. See infra notes 68-82 and accompanying text.
67. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 3.
68. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521, 1527 (D. Conn. 1984). A plaintiff
and her son brought an action against the city and its police department alleging that the
police violated their civil rights by breaching their duty to arrest plaintiff's husband after he
committed numerous assaults against her. Id. at 1524. The city moved to dismiss the action
and the court denied the motion. Id. The court held that plaintiff's complaint set forth a
violation of the equal protection clause by alleging a consistent pattern of conduct by the
Torrington police in which they inadequately protected victims of domestic violence as com-
pared to victims assaulted by strangers. Id. at 1529.
69. Id. at 1524.
70. Id. at 1524-25.
71. Id. at 1525.
72. Id.
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May 31st, but the police never arrested Charles Thurman.73
On June 10, 1983, Charles Thurman went to the home of Judy Bentley
and Richard St. Hilaire where Tracey was staying."4 Tracey called the Tor-
rington Police Department and asked them to arrest Charles. 5 Approxi-
mately fifteen minutes later, Tracey went outside to speak with Charles and
try to persuade him to leave her and her son alone.7 6 At this point Charles
pulled out a knife and stabbed his wife repeatedly in the chest, neck, and
throat.77
In Thurman v. City of Torrington, the district court expanded the duty of
police to protect battered women by holding that "a police officer may not
knowingly refrain from interference in such violence, and may not 'automat-
ically decline to make an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim
are married to each other.' "78 The court found that Tracey's complaint
alleged a pattern of acts and omissions by the Torrington Police Department
and its officers that occurred over an eight month period.7' The particular-
ized pleading evidenced the development of a pattern of "deliberate indiffer-
ence on the part of the police department to the complaints of the plaintiff
Tracey Thurman and to its duty to protect her."8 ° This pattern raised an
inference of a custom or policy within the city; therefore, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff properly alleged an illegal custom or policy as re-
quired under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.81
The Thurman decision paved the way for courts to impose liability on
states or municipalities whose police refuse to take appropriate action, i.e.
arrest, when confronted with domestic violence. In its report to the entire
D.C. City Council, the Committee on the Judiciary candidly stated that the
PDVAA was needed to "avoid . . . liability for the District of Columbia
,982
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. What made Tracey's case even more horrifying was the fact that the police did not
arrest Charles immediately upon arriving on the scene despite the fact that he was holding a
bloody knife. In the officer's presence, Charles kicked Tracey in the head twice before finally
being arrested. Id. at 1526.
78. Id. at 1528 (quoting Bruno v. Codd, 396 N.Y.S.2d 974, 976 (1976) (discussing bat-
tered wives who sued New York City alleging that the city police and clerks of the N.Y.
Family Court engaged in a consistent practice of denying battered women the assistance and
protection they were entitled to by law), rev'd on other grounds, 407 N.Y.S.2d 165 (App. Div.
1978), aff'd, 393 N.E.2d 976 (N.Y. 1979).
79. Id. at 1530.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 3.
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Jurisdictions adopting pro-arrest policies have reported subsequent reduc-
tions in domestic violence homicides.8 3 For example, in 1984 nine women in
Newport News, Virginia were victims of violent domestic homicides.8 4 Af-
ter the city instituted a pro-arrest ordinance in 1985, the number of domestic
homicides fell, reaching a low of two in 1988.8- Baltimore County, Mary-
land experienced a similar decline in the number of domestic homicides after
police implemented a policy favoring arrest and requiring a written report
for all domestic violence calls."6 In Alexandria, Virginia, a city which has a
mandatory arrest policy, the recidivism rate of men who had previously
abused their partners was 14% in 1988-for that same year, the Bureau of
Justice reported that the national rate of repeat arrests for domestic violence
was 41 .87 Proponents of the PDVAA predicted that the number of domes-
tic homicides, incidents of domestic violence, and rates of recidivism would
also decrease in the District of Columbia. a
III. CHANGES EFFECTED BY THE PDVAA
The PDVAA amends existing provisions of the District of Columbia
Code. Its stated purpose is to promote the arrest of those who perpetrate
domestic violence and to prevent, detect, and punish the crime of domestic
violence more effectively; however, the rationale underlying the Act really
appears in its legislative history.89 The PDVAA's legislative history unam-
biguously states that the D.C. City Council enacted the PDVAA in order to
minimize the risk of liability imposed on the District of Columbia because of
police nonfeasance.'
The drafters of the PDVAA left one provision of the Code dealing with
domestic violence unchanged. This provision defines intrafamily offense:
83. Testimony of Susan Paisner (on behalf of Dr. Elsie Scott, Executive Director, Na-
tional Organization for Black Law Enforcement Executives), Public Hearing on the D.C.
PDVAA (June 8, 1989), reprinted in REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 6. Ms.
Paisner based her testimony on statistics reported by the City of Newport News, Virginia and
by the Baltimore County Police Department.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. The rate of domestic homicides in Baltimore County declined 13% in the year
following implementation of this policy. In 1983, the rate had been 37%, by 1984 it was 24%.
By 1988, the rate of domestic homicides in Baltimore County decreased to 7%. Id.
87. Id. at 4-11.
88. Karlyn Barker, Domestic Abuse Arrests Expected To Soar Under New D.C. Law,
WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 1990, at B1, B7.
89. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 3.
90. Id. The members of the Committee on the Judiciary who reported to the Council
regarding the PDVAA were: Chairperson Rolark, Councilmember Crawford, Councilmember
Mason (who originally introduced and sponsored the PDVAA), Councilmember Nathanson,
and Councilmember Ray. Id. at 12.
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[I]ntrafamily offense means an act punishable as a criminal offense
committed by an offender upon a person: (A) to whom the offender
is related by blood, legal custody, marriage, having a child in com-
mon, or with whom offender shares or has shared ... a mutual
residence; and (B) with whom the offender maintains or main-
tained an intimate relationship rendering the application of this
chapter appropriate.91
This broad definition encompasses the myriad of relationships in which
domestic violence arises.92 The specificity of this provision's classifications
reflects a legislative awareness of the variety of contexts in which domestic
violence may arise, including couples that are married, unmarried, parents,
nonparents, heterosexual, or homosexual.93
A. Prosecutorial Options
Since 1970, the United States Attorneys who prosecute crimes in the Dis-
trict of Columbia have had a duty to notify the D.C. Director of Social Serv-
ices whenever complaints are filed or suspects are arrested for intrafamily
offenses.94 The Director is then permitted by law to investigate the matter
and make recommendations to the U.S. Attorney regarding the advisability
of the defendant's release. 95
Prosecutors may pursue one of two alternative courses of action. First,
the U.S. Attorney may simply refer the case to D.C. Corporation Counsel
which will file a petition for a civil protection order.96 The U.S. Attorney
must first consult the Director of Social Services to determine the appropri-
ateness of the referral. Second, the U.S. Attorney may prosecute if the vic-
tim wishes to file criminal charges or if the police make an arrest. The
statute does not provide the prosecutor with the option of sending the ac-
cused to a counseling and treatment program.97
On a national basis, prosecutors rarely pursue domestic violence cases be-
cause they impede the prosecutorial goal of obtaining the maximum number
91. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1001(5) (1989).
92. The District of Columbia's definition of intrafamily offense recognizes that violence
occurs not only between couples who are currently involved, but also between those whose
relationships have ended. Id.
93. Lisa G. Lerman, A Model State Act: Remedies For Domestic Abuse, 21 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 61, 74 (1984).
94. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1002(a) (1991).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Compare REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, at 2 with PDVAA § 16-1002(b),
37 D.C. REG. at 5001 (1991). An earlier draft of the PDVAA would have added the counsel-
ing alternative; however, it was omitted from the final version of the Act. Id.
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of convictions and guilty pleas.9" Thus, prosecutorial efforts tend to be ex-
pended on cases perceived as offering the greatest possibility for obtaining a
conviction. A national study conducted in 1977 found that while only
twenty-nine percent of cases involving stranger-to-stranger assaults were
eventually dismissed, 99 fifty-two percent of the cases in which the accused
and the victim had a past or current relationship ended in dismissal.'° This
discrepancy cannot be completely attributed to the unwillingness of prosecu-
tors to pursue these cases: victims of domestic violence are less likely to
press charges against their assailants than are victims of other crimes.101
Enabling prosecutors to pursue both criminal and civil remedies in domes-
tic violence cases can accomplish several important objectives. The first is
punishment of the offender. Subject an individual to criminal sanctions
forces him to understand that if he physically abuses a woman, he is commit-
ting a crime and will be treated accordingly. Second, the defendant may be
deterred from future violent acts or, at least, persuaded to seek professional
assistance to control his violent behavior. Finally, a victim receives protec-
tion from further abuse while pursuing criminal charges when holding a civil
protection order.
An earlier draft of the PDVAA, which included a counseling alternative,
would have undermined the objectives and accomplishments of the Act.
The counseling provision would have permitted prosecutors to legitimately
sidestep the prosecution of domestic violence cases.1o2 Thus, the U.S. Attor-
ney's Office might have continued to dismiss these difficult cases, regardless
of the victim's wishes. Assuming arguendo that the PDVAA's purpose is to
influence only police behavior, this provision would have allowed a case to
end at the arrest stage. This means that police would realize that those
whom they arrested suffered no harsh consequences as a result of their con-
98. U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 33. The Commission stated, in
Finding #4.2, that the rate of prosecution in criminal cases is significantly lower when there is
a prior or present relationship between the defendant and the victim then when an assault
between strangers takes place. Id.
99. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 27.
102. Report to the Council, supra note 18, at 3. Compare U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HEARING HELD IN PHOENIX, ARIZONA 79 (1980) (statement of Mr.
M. Louis Levin, City Prosecutor, Phoenix Arizona). Mr. Levin expressed approval of grant-
ing prosecutors the discretion of directing batterers into counseling programs stating:
I would like to see programs available to us for ... domestic violence, and at the
present time there are none available. I would like to be able to encourage those
offenders to go through the program with the hope that it will provide them some
insight and understanding... so we don't have to process them through the criminal
justice system.
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duct, making it less likely that officers would continue to comply with the
PDVAA's provisions. Because the drafters of the Act deleted the counseling
option, the PDVAA can accomplish its true purpose of "provid[ing] for the
more effective prevention, detection, and punishment of crime in the District
of Columbia .... 13
B. The New Duties Imposed on Police by the PDVAA
The PDVAA makes four major changes to the D.C. Code." It elimi-
nates the traditional requirement that a police officer obtain a warrant before
making an arrest for a misdemeanor unless the offense takes place in his
presence. Furthermore, it places an affirmative duty on the police to arrest
when they have probable cause to believe that an intrafamily offense has
occurred. 5 The statute also requires that police officers file written reports
for every domestic violence incident they investigate and that the police de-
partment maintain those reports. 1°6 The PDVAA specifies the components
of an instructional program in domestic violence in which all officers must
participate. 107 Finally, the Act requires the MPD to maintain computerized
records of all civil protection orders and bench warrants that the Family
Division of the D.C. Superior Court issues.' 08
Chapter 10 of the D.C. Code deals specifically with intrafamily of-
fenses.' 9 The PDVAA creates a new subchapter in Chapter 10 which im-
poses the most significant new duties on police.'1 0 In subchapter III, a
provision mandates arrest when police have probable cause to believe a per-
son violates a civil protection order or commits an intrafamily offense that
results in either physical injury or the fear that such injury is imminent."'
103. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attachment 2, at 1 (emphasis added).
104. See supra note 22-25 and accompanying text.
105. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1031(a)(1) (1991).
106. Id. § 16-1032.
107. Id. § 16-1034(a).
108. Id. § 4-131(4A).
109. The title of Chapter 10 is "Proceedings Regarding Intrafamily Offenses." § 16-1001
(1991).
110. § 16-1031 (1991).
111. Id. § 16-1031. Section 16-1031 provides:
(a) a law enforcement officer shall arrest a person if the law enforcement officer has
probable cause to believe that the person: (1) committed an intrafamily offense that
resulted in physical injury, including physical pain or illness, regardless of whether or
not the intrafamily offense was committed in the presence of the law enforcement
officer; or (2) committed an intrafamily offense that caused or was intended to cause
reasonable fear of imminent serious physical injury or death.
(b) The law enforcement officer shall present the person arrested under subsection (a)
of this section to the United States Attorney for charging under section 16-1002.
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The provision explicitly states that the offense must result in either physical
injury or a "reasonable fear of imminent serious physical injury .... 12
The most significant language in this section eliminates the traditional re-
quirement that a misdemeanor offense take place in the presence of police
officers before they can make a warrantless arrest.' 1 3
This important section of the PDVAA underwent several drafts prior to
its adoption. One of the most significant changes was the elimination of
language requiring police to arrest the "primary physical aggressor" in a
domestic violence situation. 1 4 This provision also contained a list of factors
for police to consider in making a determination of which party was the
"primary physical aggressor." These factors included:
(A) The legislative intent to protect victims of domestic violence;
(B) The relative degree of injuries inflicted or serious fears creating
fear of physical injury;
(C) Past incidents of domestic violence between the persons in-
volved, as determined by:
(i) information obtained from department records including
calls to dispatchers and incident reports filed by officers;
(ii) information provided by the courts, including civil protec-
tion orders, bench warrants, and restraining orders issued in civil
or criminal actions.1 1
5
The drafters removed this language from the PDVAA prior to its submis-
sion to the D.C. City Council and its subsequent enactment. Examination of
the testimony of Inspector David W. Bostrom reveals that the MPD ob-
jected to officers having to determine which party was the "primary physical
aggressor. ' "16 The objection may have resulted from police reluctance to
consult the proposed sources for information on the parties when the police
confronted a situation which required immediate action and resolution.
The section as enacted accomplishes several important objectives. It af-
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Compare id. § 16-1031(a) with REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attach. 1,
§ 16-1031(a)(2).
115. See REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attach. 1, § 16-1031(b).
116. Id. attach. 3, at 4. The relevant portion of Inspector Bostrom's testimony reads:
This concept, in terms of police arrest powers-to my knowledge-is a departure
from established law. While the concept may be an appropriate consideration for a
jury or a judge at the time of sentencing, it does not appear to be an appropriate
consideration in the context of arresting people. Probable cause is relatively straight-
forward. A law enforcement officer, applying a "reasonable person" standard, deter-
mines that a crime has been committed and the person the officer is about to arrest
committed that crime.
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firms the public policy that police should uniformly enforce the District's
criminal assault laws regardless of whether a victim and assailant are or were
intimately involved. Section 16-1031 unequivocally informs police that the
appropriate response to domestic violence is the arrest of the perpetrator.
Thus, the exercise of the police arrest power becomes mandatory-not dis-
cretionary-as long as the requisite probable cause exists. If police violate
this statutory duty, victims may sue the department for breach." 7 The Dis-
trict's possible exposure to liability strongly condemns the MPD's previous
method of dealing with domestic violence.
The PDVAA also affects the manner in which District police maintain
records. Section 16-1032 requires police officers to file written reports when-
ever they investigate an intrafamily offense." 8 There is no qualification to
this requirement; police must file reports whether or not the investigation
culminates in an arrest." 9 The statute also imposes a duty on the MPD to
maintain these reports.'20
Several factors support the imposition of these record-keeping duties. A
report file aids police when they receive numerous calls involving the same
parties. If officers know who is involved and what the history of the parties
is, they can better prepare themselves to handle the situation. If a victim
decides to pursue criminal or civil remedies or both, the reports will provide
credible verification of the parties' accounts of the incident. Additionally,
should a victim bring an action for the failure of police to arrest, she may be
able to use records showing a pattern of violence and police inaction in her
evidentiary presentation. A final consideration involves the usefulness of
written incident reports as research data. Records may provide valuable sta-
tistics on police responses, frequency of incidents, and types of abusive sce-
narios.'" ' This information is extremely valuable in educating the public,
lawmakers, and law enforcement officials on the extent to which domestic
violence pervades American society.
Generally, all police departments impose a duty on their officers, to file
incident reports; however, studies demonstrate that officers routinely ignore
this requirement.' 22 The most effective way to ensure police compliance
117. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984). See also, Balis-
treri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990); Watson v. City of Kansas, 857 F.2d
690 (10th Cir. 1988).
118. § 16-1032 (1991).
119. Id. The provision does specify that officers should state the disposition of each
incident.
120. Id.
121. For a discussion of the difficulty encountered in obtaining reliable data on the perva-
siveness of domestic violence in the United States, see supra note 4 and accompanying text.
122. Lerman, supra note 93, at 123.
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with this requirement is to incorporate it into officers' training in domestic
violence. Also, a department should consider imposing fines or other disci-
plinary action when officers fail to file the reports.
The PDVAA also addresses the issue of police liability when they do make
an arrest. 123 Section 16-1033 reads: "A law enforcement officer shall not be
civilly liable solely because he or she makes an arrest in good faith and with-
out malice pursuant to this subchapter."'' 24 Earlier versions of the PDVAA
did not contain this provision; apparently, the drafters added it at the re-
quest of the MPD and the D.C. Corporation Counsel-the two organiza-
tions that would defend an officer if a plaintiff brought an action for false
arrest. 125 The section as enacted also differs from the one proposed by the
police. The MPD's preferred liability provision would protect police from
liability when they failed to arrest as well as when they did arrest. This
would take the force out of the entire PDVAA-police officers would have
been able to ignore their statutory duty without fearing the imposition of
reprisals or other consequences.
The liability provision of section 16-1033 reinforces the premise that pub-
lic policy in the District of Columbia demands that police cease mediating
between batterers and their victims and begin arresting them. As long as an
arrest meets the "good faith and without malice"' 126 standard, an officer can-
not be civilly liable. Hopefully, this protection will increase police motiva-
tion in complying with the PDVAA.
Finally, subchapter III addresses the domestic violence training received
by officers and the law pertaining to it. 12  Police recruits must have a mini-
123. § 16-1033 (1991).
124. Id. An earlier version of this provision was much broader than the section that was
enacted. See REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attach. 3, at 5. (testimony of Inspector
David W. Bostrom before the Committee on the Judiciary on June 8, 1989). The proposed
provision read:
Neither the District of Columbia, nor any law enforcement officer, shall incur civil
liability based solely on the commission or omission of any action called for in this
subchapter, including making or failing to make an arrest. Nothing in this law shall
be construed to limit any defenses or immunities otherwise available to the District
government or its police officers.
Id. at 5.
125. REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attach. 3, at 4, 5.
126. § 16-1033 (1991).
127. Id. § 16-1034. Compare REPORT TO THE COUNCIL, supra note 18, attach. 3, at 2, 5
(testimony of Inspector David W. Bostrom, comparing the training program of the MPD with
the one required by the PDVAA). Inspector Bostrom noted:
Since January 1979, a 40-hour block of training, entitled "Family Crisis Interven-
tion," has been a component of this department's recruit training program. Id. at-
tach. 3, at 2. The family crisis intervention training given all new officers ... exceeds
the requirements outlined in the [PDVAA] legislation, both in terms of content and
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mum of twenty hours of training, while veteran officers must participate in
an eight hour program.' 28 The discrepancy is due to the fact that veteran
officers are aware of the requirements of probable cause and, therefore, need
less instruction. The PDVAA establishes broad criteria for the curriculum
of this training, thereby granting a great deal of discretion to the MPD and
those formulating the program.12 9 This allows the use of varying ap-
proaches for conveying information. The MPD is working with the D.C.
Coalition Against Domestic Violence in developing the program. The Coali-
tion's participation will ensure that mediation is not emphasized as a method
new officers should employ in confronting domestic violence. The PDVAA
specifically authorizes this collaboration13 ° which will ensure that the train-
ing program conforms to the purpose of section 16-1034: enforcing the law
against intrafamily offenses., 3  Research shows, however, that police re-
cruits rarely receive training which emphasizes the circumstances when they
should make arrests; thus, this purpose will be difficult to achieve., 32
Police recruits are probably aware of society's condemnation of domestic
violence. Their outlook may be more sensitive to the changing attitudes dis-
played in the media toward battered women and their assailants, making the
new officers more responsive to the idea that these abusers are criminals and
duration, for all items except the requirement that this new legislation be outlined to
the officers.
Id. attach. 3, at 5.
128. § 16-1034(c) - (d) (1991). The training for officers already on the force is a new addi-
tion to the MPD's training program.
129. Id. § 16-1034(a) - (b). Section 16-1034(a) lists five areas in which police are to receive
instruction. They are:
(1) The nature, dimension, and causes of intrafamily offenses;
(2) The legal rights and remedies available to a victim or perpetrator of an in-
trafamily offense;
(3) The services and facilities available to a victim or perpetrator of an intrafamily
offense;
(4) The legal duties imposed on a police officer to enforce the provisions of this sub-
chapter and to offer protection and assistance to a victim of an intrafamily offense;
(5) Techniques for handling an intrafamily offense that minimize the likelihood of
injury to the officer and promote the safety of the victim.
§ 16-1034(a).
130. Section 16-1034(b), provides:
The training shall stress the importance of enforcing the law against intrafamily of-
fenses. The Police force may:
(1) Utilize the resources of any law enforcement agency or community organization;
and
(2) Invite any community organization that provides counselling or assistance to vic-
tims of intrafamily offenses to help in planning and presenting the training program.
§ 16-1034(b).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., Gottlieb & Johnson, supra note 10, at 541.
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should be arrested for their actions. However, experienced officers, comfort-
able with the department's former policy of mediation, may resist con-
forming with the dictates of the PDVAA. Their attitudes and practices must
be changed to conform with the duties imposed by the PDVAA. Such a
change cannot be accomplished by simply mandating attendance at one
eight-hour training session. Because these veteran officers exert a great deal
of influence over rookie officers entering the force, the MPD must ensure
that the recruit's training in domestic violence is not undone by a senior
partner's antiquated beliefs that police should not get involved in domestic
situations. 33
Unfortunately, a more extensive training program for experienced mem-
bers of the force is unlikely to be instituted. Neither the time nor the funds
needed to implement such a program is available. Additionally, veteran of-
ficers might resent being forced to participate in more than one session, and
with such feelings, additional training sessions will probably not improve the
officers' performance in resolving situations of domestic violence.
The final change effectuated by the PDVAA is an amendment to title 4,
section 131 of the District of Columbia Code. New language in this section
details the specific types of records which the MPD must maintain. 134 Ac-
cording to the statute, the MPD must maintain a computerized record of all
civil protection orders and bench warrants issued by the Family Division of
the D.C. Superior Court for intrafamily offenses.' 35 By maintaining a record
of this sort, police will be able to confirm the existence of CPO's and bench
warrants so that they may make arrests when batterers violate these orders
or warrants. If someone violates a CPO or bench warrant and the police fail
to take appropriate action, the victim may utilize this record to support an
inference that officers breached their duty of protection. Again, this threat
of liability will encourage compliance with the PDVAA's dictates.
IV. THE PDVAA COMPARED To OTHER MANDATORY ARREST LAWS
By 1988, twelve states had enacted mandatory arrest laws.' 36 The
PDVAA adopted some provisions of these laws, rejecting those that have not
133. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE HEARINGS HELD IN PHOE-
NIX, ARIZONA 11 (1980) (statement of Ellen Lyon, Executive Director, Sojourner Center,
Phoenix, Arizona). Ms. Lyon, testifying about one hour police training sessions conducted by
shelter staff, said "The recruits who were there basically stated ... that they had been told by
training officers that it was a waste of paper to write up a complaint in a domestic violence
situation, that it was a waste of time to take the assailant in." Id. at 11.
134. D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-131 (1991).
135. Id.
136. See supra note 17.
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been effective in combatting police failure to arrest. Overall, the PDVAA
most closely resembles the mandatory arrest laws of Oregon and Iowa. The
Oregon statute requires police to arrest for all assaults, regardless of whether
that assault occurred in an officer's presence.137 It also contains a broad
definition of domestic violence.138 Iowa's law mandates arrest when police
have probable cause to believe that a domestic assault resulting in physical
injury has occurred, that an assault with intent to inflict physical injury has
occurred, or that an alleged assailant has used or displayed a dangerous
weapon.'39 The PDVAA follows the approach of both Oregon and Iowa by
permitting police to arrest not only when actual phjsical injury results, but
also when a situation creates the fear of imminent physical harm without
subsequent injury.1'4
Like the PDVAA, the arrest laws of North Carolina and Minnesota man-
date arrest for the violation of a civil protection order. However, neither
state demands arrest for criminal acts of violence. North Carolina requires
police to make warrantless arrests when they can determine the existence of
a CPO and possess probable cause to believe that order has been violated. 141
Minnesota's statute is very similar. It explicitly states that the violation of a
CPO constitutes a misdemeanor and requires police to arrest without a war-
rant when such a violation takes place.1 42 By making the violation of a CPO
a crime, North Carolina, Minnesota, and now the District of Columbia, em-
137. OR. REV. STAT. § 133.055(2) (1989) provides:
[Wihen a peace officer is at the scene of a domestic disturbance and has probable
cause to believe that an assault has occurred between spouses, former spouses[,] or
adult persons related by blood or marriage or persons of opposite sex residing to-
gether or who formerly resided together, or to believe that one such person has
placed the other in fear of imminent serious physical injury, the officer shall arrest
and take into custody the alleged assailant or potential assailant.
138. Id. See supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
139. IOWA CODE ANN. § 236.12(2) (West Supp. 1991).
140. § 16-1031(a)(2) (1991).
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50B-4(b) (1989) provides:
(b) A law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody without a
warrant or other process if the officer has probable cause to believe that the person
has violated a court order excluding the person from the residence or household
occupied by a victim of domestic violence or directing the person to refrain from
harassing or interfering with the victim, and if the victim, or someone acting on the
victim's behalf, presents the law-enforcement officer with a copy of the order or the
officer determines that such an order exists, and can ascertain the contents thereof,
through phone, radio[,] or other communication with appropriate authorities.
142. The relevant portion of the statute states: "[V]iolation of the order for protection is a
misdemeanor .... A peace officer shall arrest without a warrant.., a person whom the peace
officer has probable cause to believe has violated an order .... MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.01
(14) (West Supp. 1991).
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power police to arrest for its violation, thereby increasing the effectiveness of
the CPO as a protective device.
Another feature which the PDVAA shares with Minnesota's Domestic Vi-
olence Statute is an immunity provision. 143 The Minnesota statute is very
similar to the PDVAA, in that it protects peace officers from civil liability
when they act in good faith and exercise due care. 44 Minnesota also re-
quires officers to file written reports for all incidents of domestic violence
that they investigate, and to undergo specialized training in domestic
violence. 145
The PDVAA is mu~h more comprehensive than the mandatory arrest
laws of New Jersey and Wisconsin. Both of these states require that evi-
dence of physical injury be present before police may arrest without a war-
rant. New Jersey specifically states that arrest is mandatory only "if a victim
exhibits signs of injury caused by an act of domestic violence.' 46 Wiscon-
sin's slightly more liberal Domestic Violence Act requires arrest when signs
of injury are present or when an officer believes there is a possibility for
continued violence. 147 Listing these factors in the disjunctive indicates some
awareness that police need discretion and flexibility in handling situations of
domestic violence. However, the PDVAA protects both actual and potential
victims, thus detering domestic violence more effectively than either the New
Jersey or the Wisconsin laws.
Four states-Connecticut, Minnesota, Nevada, and Washington-require
arrest only if police receive notice of a domestic assault within a prescribed
time period. In Nevada, Minnesota, and Washington, police must arrest if
an assault took place no more than four hours prior to their notification. 1
48
143. See supra notes 123-136 and accompanying text.
144. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (2) (West Supp. 1991).
145. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (4), (5) (West Supp. 1991).
146. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:25-5(a) (West 1991). The "signs of injury" requirement may
be problematic because injuries such as bruises may not manifest until the day following an
assault.
147. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 968.075(2) (West Supp. 1991) provides:
[A] law enforcement officer shall arrest and take a person into custody if. (1) The
officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person is committing or has com-
mitted domestic abuse and that the person's actions constitute the commission of a
crime; and (2) Either or both of the following circumstances are present: a. The of-
ficer has a reasonable basis for believing that ... continued domestic abuse against
the alleged victim is likely. b. There is evidence of physical injury to the alleged
victim.
148. The Nevada statute requires arrest when police have probable cause to believe a per-
son has committed battery upon a family or household member. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 171.137(1) (Michie 1986). Washington mandates arrest when the alleged abuser is at least
18 years of age and a police officer believes:
(i) A felonious assault has occurred; (ii) An assault has occurred which has resulted
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Connecticut does not specify a specific time period; it requires arrest if an
officer "upon speedy information" determines that a domestic assault took
place. 49 In contrast, the PDVAA does not contain a specific time period in
which victims must notify police of an assault. This provides a victim time
to receive medical treatment and contemplate what, if any, course of action
she wishes to pursue. A complainant who rationally decides to file and press
criminal charges may be more likely to pursue her complaint. This type of
victim may not be the norm, but the structure of the PDVAA permits the
possibility that one exists.
These statutes appear to have influenced the drafters of the PDVAA. The
drafters examined the state laws and drew from the various requirements
and provisions of each statute.15 0 As a result, they developed the PDVAA in
a manner that maximized its effectiveness. The Act does not provide police
with loopholes which would enable them to ignore the mandates of the Act.
Clearly, the PDVAA should prove more effective in combatting police iner-
tia towards domestic violence than earlier state statutes.
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS To THE PDVAA
The Prevention of Domestic Violence Amendment Act of 1990 effects sev-
eral important changes in the way District of Columbia police respond to
and resolve situations of domestic violence. Obviously, one law cannot com-
pletely abolish a problem as prevalent in society as domestic violence, none-
theless the PDVAA accomplishes a great deal. The PDVAA provides that
officers receive instruction on informing victims of their legal rights and rem-
edies and the support services and social agencies which provide them with
the particular services they need. However, in order to ensure that each
victim receives a thorough description of her rights and available support
services, the information should be printed on a card or pamphlet which
officers can distribute and explain. In light of the District of Columbia's
large Spanish-speaking population, this material should appear in both Eng-
lish and Spanish. The cost of printing this material and the burden on police
to distribute it appears minimal compared to the benefit it would generate
for victims.
in bodily injury to the victim, whether the injury is observable by the responding
officer or not; or (iii) that any physical action has occurred which was intended to
cause another person reasonably to fear imminent serious bodily injury or death.
Bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or an impairment of physical condition.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.31.100(2)(b) (West 1991). This same section contains the re-
quirement that the assault have occurred "within the preceding four hours." Id. See also
MINN STAT. ANN. § 629.341 (1) (West Supp. 1991).
149. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38b(a) (1990).
150. Duval, supra note 14, at 1-9.
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The first step in combatting police prejudice against domestic violence vic-
tims is to educate police officers. However, other officers within the criminal
justice system share the same outdated attitudes held by police that the
PDVAA hopes to combat. Prosecutors and judges cannot shirk their duties
anymore than the police. Therefore, efforts at educating these persons must
also be made. One method of accomplishing this is to develop continuing
legal education programs that focus on domestic violence issues. This will
help publicize the various statutory changes made by jurisdictions.
Finally, the PDVAA should include provisions establishing a periodic re-
view of police practices and the statute's effect once it is fully imple-
mented.1 5' Local advocacy groups cannot shoulder the entire burden of
ensuring that the MPD fully and properly implements the PDVAA. Estab-
lishing long-term reviews will also enable legislators and researchers to de-
termine what provisions of the statute are effective and which ones require
revision. Because domestic violence perpetuates itself from generation to
generation within families,'" 2 it is vital to continue examining and revising
the methods designed to eliminate it. Otherwise, a law such as the PDVAA
may prove merely a temporary aid to an entrenched societal problem.
VI. CONCLUSION
The District of Columbia's Prevention of Domestic Violence Amendment
Act of 1990 exemplifies legislation enacted to change the response of police
to domestic violence. The PDVAA is not a complete solution to the use of
violence by men against the women with whom they are intimately involved.
Such violence results from society's long-held belief in women's inferiority to
men and demands deeper probing into society's attitudes. However, the
PDVAA is one step towards the goal of eradicating domestic violence, and it
must be fully implemented and studied so that other jurisdictions can assist
their citizens who fall prey to domestic violence.
Nicole M. Montalto
151. According to a letter sent to D.C. area law students by the D.C. Coalition Against
Domestic Violence, a police monitoring project was planned for the summer and fall of 1991,
the period of the PDVAA's implementation. The purpose of the project was to determine if
police file the reports required by the Act, and participants were to contact victims to deter-
mine what their situation entailed and how they viewed the police response to it. Letter from
Deborah Epstein and Ayesha Kahn, D.C. Coalition Against Domestic Violence, to D.C. area
law students (Jan. 14, 1991) (on file with THE JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTH LAW
AND POLICY).
152. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text (explaining that children who are raised in
an environment that contains family violence are more likely to physically abuse their own
spouses).
